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A B S T R A C T 
The HiPER project, phase 4a, is evolving. In this study we present the progress made in the field of 
neutronics and radiological protection for an integrated design of the facility. In the current model, we take 
into account the optical systems inside the target bay, as well as the remote handling requirements and 
related infrastructure, together with different shields. The last reference irradiation scenario, consisting 
of 20 MJ of neutron yields, 5 yields per burst, one burst every week and 30 years of expected lifetime 
is considered for this study. We have performed a characterization of the dose rates behavior in the 
facility, both during operation and between bursts. The dose rates are computed for workers, regarding 
to maintenance and handling, and also for optical systems, regarding to damage. Furthermore, we have 
performed a waste management assessment of all the components inside the target bay. Results indicate 
that remote maintenance is mandatory in some areas. The small beam penetrations in the shields are 
responsible for some high doses in some specific locations. With regards to optics, the residual doses are 
as high as prompt doses. It is found that the whole target bay may be fully managed as a waste in 30 
years by recycling and/or clearance, with no need for burial. 
1. Introduction 
It is foreseen that High Power laser Energy Research (HiPER) 
phase 4a will be an experimental facility for testing the integra-
tion of high repetition rate technologies related to Inertial Fusion 
Energy (IFE). During the last several years, the different groups 
inside the HiPER project have proposed alternative solutions for 
the systems they are in charge of (optical assembly, lasers, tar-
get injection...). A preliminary integrated design, coupling optical 
systems together with shields against neutrons and gammas, was 
evaluated from the standpoint of radiological assessment [1]. A 
deep study was also accomplished on the materials selection for 
the reaction chamber [2]. Linking the conclusions of those studies 
[1,2] to some changes in the baseline design, a new and advanced 
design of HiPER 4a target bay is ready. In this advanced design three 
systems are integrated: optical systems, remote maintenance sys-
tems and shielding requirements. The arrangement of the systems 
is described in the subsection 1.1. It has been decided to set the ref-
erence irradiation scenario of HiPER 4a as follows: It will operate 
in 100 shots bursts. In every burst there will be only 5 ignitions, 
with 20 MJ neutron yields each one. The other 95 shots, non-yield 
shots, will not ignite, but they will be oriented to other aspects of 
illumination. However, aspects such as debris or shrapnel are not 
addressed in this study. One burst will take place every week, what 
represents 5200MJ/year of neutron yield. It is assumed a 30 years 
lifetime for the facility. 
We present a dose rates and waste management assessment for 
the advanced design of HiPER 4a target bay, considering the new 
reference irradiation scenario. Taking into account the obtained 
results, we offer an evaluation of the shielding proposal regarding to 
protection to workers and to optical systems during the operation 
of the facility. In the time between bursts, we characterize the dif-
ferent areas from the standpoint of residual dose rates for workers. 
We offer a waste management assessment of all the components 
inside the target bay. 
1.1. Baseline design 
The advanced design of HiPER 4a, integrates the main systems of 
the target bay: optical systems, remote handling infrastructure, and 
shielding requirements. The different systems and their configura-
tion are briefly explained in this section. Figs. 1 and 2 are devoted 
to explain this design. 
Centered in the origin, there is the reaction chamber. It has an 
inner radius of 5 m, and 10 cm of thickness. It is built of T91 com-
mercial steel [3].The chamber presents 48 penetrations forthe laser 
beams. The beams are brought to the chamber through 48 beam 
tubes which keep the vacuum inside. These tubes are also made 
of T91 steel. They have a squared section of 1 m per 1 m. The wall 
thickness of the beam tubes is 1 cm. At 8 m from the origin and 
Fig. 1. General view of the advanced design of HiPER 4a. 
inside the beam tubes, there are 48 focusing lenses. They are called 
the "renewable optics", and they are placed in front of the explo-
sions with no shield to protect them against the resulting radiation. 
The renewable optics are squared lenses of 75 cm side and 5 cm of 
thickness. At 19 m from the origin, also inside beam tubes, there 
are 48 groups of optical elements, named the Final Optics Assem-
bly (FOA). These groups consist of 6 optical elements with different 
functions (mirrors, focusing lenses and frequency converters). All 
the elements are squares of 75 cm side, with thicknesses varying 
from 1 to 5 cm. They are also made of pure silica. 
We have proposed four shields in the target bay to protect both 
the workers and the optics. The first one is placed against the reac-
tion chamber and it is called the chamber shield. It consists of a 
spherical shell of 80 cm of thickness, made of borated concrete. 
This material choice is motivated by NIF [4] choice of chamber 
shield. Given the efficiency of shielding close to the source, its thick-
ness has doubled from the previous design. We pursue a general 
reduction of neutron spreading with this decision. At 16 m from 
the origin, and outside the beam tubes, there is the FOA shield. It 
is a 2.5 m thick shield made of standard concrete. To improve the 
previous situation between bursts in some areas regarding waiting 
Fig. 2. Detailed view of the main optical systems: renewable lenses, final optics 
assembly, pinhole shield and beam tubes. 
time for workers entrance, its size has increased from 2 to 2.5 m 
from the previous design, and its shape has changed from spherical 
to a double cylinder, because of remote handling systems require-
ments. At the same position, but inside the beam tubes, there are 
the pinhole shields. They are 48 concrete cylinders, with 50 cm 
of radius and 2.5 m long, placed inside the beam tubes, present-
ing a conical perforation to allow the beam go through. Finally, 
there is a cylindrical shell shape bioshield of 25 m of inner radius 
and 2 m of thickness. This shield has not been optimized, as beam 
penetrations sizes have not been defined and a lot of machinery 
has still to be defined. However, it is expected that this bioshield 
will be the final barrier against radiation during the operation of 
the facility. This distribution of shields defines 4 areas which need 
a radiological classification with regards to workers access both 
during operation and during the maintenance. The interior of the 
chamber is well defined, and requires no special name. The space 
between the chamber shield and the FOA shield is called area 1. The 
space between the FOA shield and the bioshield is called the area 
2; the space outside the bioshield is called area 3. We assume only 
workers in the facility, thus no reference is made to public. 
The remote handling systems requirements have forced the 
FOA shield to change its shape from spherical to double cylinder. 
Attached to this shield, there are four rails, from which the robots 
will access to the beam tubes, renewable optics and to outer part 
of the reaction chamber. The rails are made of steel alloy BS970-
817M40 [5]. The remote maintenance in the interior of the reaction 
chamber does not impose restrictions on the shields, but on the 
chamber material. As it will be necessary for the chamber to exert 
some structural functions, aluminum alloys are definitively aban-
doned as candidate materials for the reaction chamber in benefit of 
steel alloys. Commercial T91 steel has been selected from a previous 
study [2] for waste management considerations. 
1.2. Objectives 
We present a dose rate and waste management assessment of 
the advanced design of HiPER 4a target bay, integrating optical 
systems, remote handling infrastructure and shielding require-
ments. We pursue to characterize the radiological performance 
and justify the materials choice for this design. We divide the 
study in three stages of the lifetime of the facility: burst opera-
tion, period between bursts, and decommissioning. This study is 
interesting to make decisions on many aspects, such as materials 
choice, placement of equipments, systems configurations or remote 
maintenance design. 
2. Study scope 
The radiation presence offers a natural division in three stages 
in the time of interest for this study: the burst operation of the 
facility, where important neutron and gamma dose rates levels are 
reached during short periods of time; the time between bursts, 
where gamma dose rates resulting from the activation of the facil-
ity can be high enough to preclude the access of worker to certain 
areas; and the decommissioning, the period after the definitive 
shutdown of the facility when cooling times are spent for differ-
ent waste management strategies for the activated components. 
All the materials have been studied considering a real or reason-
able impurities concentrations, and their effect on the activation 
behavior has been taken into account. 
2.1. Burst operation 
While explosions happen, there is a neutron spreading. A lot 
of these neutrons interact and generates gamma rays, which also 
spread through the target bay. The combination of neutron and 
gamma fluxes gives rise to high dose rates which affect to the 
workers and to the optical systems. Regarding to the workers, we 
compute the ambient dose equivalent [6], and take into consider-
ation the limit for workers 20 mSv/year [7]. We have performed a 
dose rate map of the target bay. With regards to the optical ele-
ments, we compute the absorbed dose, via the deposited energy, 
by neutrons and gamma separately, in the renewable lenses and in 
the FOA. 
The dose rates map during operation offers a radiological evalu-
ation of the different rooms inside the target bay. This map is useful 
for several reasons. We assign different classifications to rooms 
where the dose rates are above the limit during operation to the 
areas where workers could stand. An idea about the cold and hot 
regions inside every room is obtained. For example, if certain equip-
ment may remain during the explosions in any area, where to place 
it is an important information. This map represents an evaluation 
of the proposal of shielding. If necessary, further modifications to 
the shielding scheme will be made if, for example, better shield-
ing is necessary for the optical systems, or electronic devices are 
defined to be placed in hot areas. The damage to optical systems 
induced by the irradiation is a complex phenomenon requiring a 
study apart. The group called "renewable lenses" is troublesome in 
this design, and its survivability is not clear due to the impact of ions 
and X-rays. However, the FOA is properly protected against short 
penetration radiation, and its survivability is assumed. The impor-
tant damage for the FOA is induced by the neutrons and gammas. 
We assess the delivered dose rates to FOA during the burst opera-
tion. We compare that value against what would be obtained in the 
case of absence of FOA and pinhole shield. This comparison stands 
for an evaluation of shields. 
To do these calculations, we model and translate the geome-
try with MCAM [8]. It is a computational tool that performs 3D 
design, and generates an input for the geometry for MCNPX [9]. 
We use MCNPX to transport the neutrons and the gamma. With 
the flux-to-dose conversion coefficients [6] we obtain the ambient 
dose equivalent, and express it in a dose map of the facility. Also 
with MCNPX we compute directly the deposited energy in the opti-
cal systems. To perform the particles transport, we have used the 
ENDF-VII [10] neutron transport data library. 
2.2. Period between bursts 
Due to the neutron spreading during the explosions, the com-
ponents inside the target bay get activated. The resulting gamma 
irradiation gives rise to residual dose rates. These doses may affect 
to the workers and optical elements. Regarding to the workers, in 
the period between bursts, the manual maintenance is not pos-
sible in some areas. As no specific task has yet been defined, the 
computed residual dose rates will be averaged on the whole space 
between shields. For workers we compute the ambient dose equiv-
alent. With regards to the optics, the absorbed dose on the elements 
is calculated. For both calculations, it is also studied the partial 
contribution of the different elements to the residual dose rate, to 
identify potential responsible components. This information could 
be useful to reduce the residual dose rate by acting the specific 
troublesome components. 
From the point of view of computational methodology, this cal-
culation is performed in several steps. First of all, the neutron flux 
is computed in every single component of the target bay. With 
MCNPX, this information is requested, in a Vitamin-J structure valid 
for using EAF-2010 activation libraries [11]. The neutron fluxes 
together with the EAF-2010 libraries are used by ACAB code [12] to 
evaluate the isotopic inventory and its time evolution. The result-
ing decay gammas computed with ACAB are introduced in MCNPX. 
The last step consists of the transport of the resulting gamma 
irradiation to evaluate the ambient dose equivalent averaged in 
the areas between shields, and the absorbed dose in the FOA. 
2.3. Decommissioning 
It is expected that after 30 years of operation, the facility 
had completed its lifetime. The components inside the target bay 
that have been exposed to neutron irradiation may have become 
radioactive and require a special consideration as wastes. We 
perform a waste management assessment (WMA) of all the com-
ponents inside the target bay to support the decision making on the 
choice of materials and also to estimate and show general trends 
about the management of the activated material. This study of the 
WMA is the continuity of [2], where we evaluated the behavior of 
different steels for the reaction chamber. 
In the evaluation of the waste management, we have consid-
ered the following strategies: clearance, recycling and burial, with 
this order of preference. We mainly focus on clearance as the most 
attractive approach to the problem. If clearance is not possible, 
we evaluate the recycling possibility as alternative to clearance for 
waste management. The clearance is allowed when the clearance 
index (CI) is below unity [13]. If Clearance is not possible, recycling 
is the second best approach. Depending on the material, the criteria 
for recycling are the specific activity or the decay heat. If the mate-
rial is a steel alloy, the adopted upper limit for recycling is 1000 Bq/g 
[14]. Above this limit, steels may not be melted in foundries. If steel 
alloy is not the material to be recycled, the decay heat seems to be 
the only limitation for recycling. Thus, we adopt 2000 W/m3 [14], 
the active cooling limit as the upper limit for recycling. However it 
could be the case that none of these paths is possible, thus we also 
evaluate the viability of shallow-land burial. This last path depends 
on the waste disposal rate index, which should be below unity 
to allow a SLB. Independently of the waste management strategy, 
we also evaluate how to handle the material, remote or hands-on 
manipulation. Mean the contact dose rate, we adopt a 10|jiSv/h 
limit for hands-on manipulation and assess the contact dose rates 
against this limit. 
The computational methodology in this case consists in intro-
ducing the neutron fluxes calculated with MCNPX in the ACAB code 
to compute the following quantities: clearance index [13], Contact 
dose rate, specific activity, decay heat and waste disposal rating 
[15] as class C waste. 
3. Results 
We present in this section the evaluation of the quantities men-
tioned in Section 2. After the presentation of the results, we assess 
their implications, and we explore different variations of the base-
line design which could improve the found behavior. 
3.1. Burst operation 
During the operation, the neutron spread and the subsequent 
gamma production give rise to high dose rates that affect both the 
workers and the optical systems, and, when defined, to the elec-
tronic machinery and diagnostics. To evaluate the impact of the 
burst operation on the workers, we compute a dose rate map of the 
ambient dose equivalent. In this map it is also possible to find infor-
mation about how the radiation is distributed in the target bay, and 
where are the most and least dose exposed locations in this design. 
We also compute the absorbed dose rate into the FOA to evaluate 
how important is the FOA Shield. 
3.1.1. Dose to workers 
In Fig. 3 there is the dose rate map of the ambient dose equivalent 
during the operation. It is assumed that a worker would stand in the 
Table 1 
Averaged absorbed dose rate in FOA for HiPER 4a advanced design and different 
contributions. 
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Fig. 3. Prompt dose rates maps assuming the presence of a person in all the explo-
sions of the year. Ambient dose equivalent to workers. The Bioshield has been 
considered in the simulation. 
facility during all the explosions taking place in a year. It is seen that 
the area 1 is well above the limit of 20mSv/year, thus workers are 
not allowed to stay there during the operation. The area 2 is mostly 
below the limit, but there are some locations which are above. The 
pinhole in the FOA shield represents a way out for the neutrons and 
gammas which projects a straight line of dose rate level above the 
limit. 
In fact, the pinholes are the main responsible for the dose rates in 
the area 2. In Fig. 4, we have computed two dose rate maps. On the 
left side of Fig. 4, it is presented a dose rate map corresponding to 
the FOA shield with no penetrations. The dose rates are well below 
the limit for workers, and are close to 10~7 Sv/year. On the right side 
of Fig. 4, however, we have computed the resulting dose rate map 
exclusively due to the particles spreading through the pinholes; any 
particle coming out through other component is not considered for 
this calculation. The dose rates in any location of the area 2 (Fig. 3) 
are very close to those found in the right hand side of Fig. 4. We con-
clude that the dose rates in area 2 are mainly due to the spreading 
of particles through the pinholes. We find unacceptable the simpli-
fication of no-pinhole FOA shield to assess the prompt dose rates, as 
there is a difference of up eight orders of magnitude. It is important 
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Fig. 4. Left: prompt dose rates map due to all the particles except those crossing the 
pinhole. Right: prompt dose rates map due exclusively to the particles crossing the 
pinhole. Ambient dose equivalent to workers. The Bioshield has been considered in 
the simulation. 
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to note that the prompt dose rate may not be reduced by increas-
ing the thickness if the FOA shield. There is a minimum dose rate 
during the burst operation in this design, which corresponds to the 
particles coming through the beam penetrations. 
Obviously, this situation will be altered when roofs and floors 
were taken into account, as they will deflect the particles, and the 
dose rates in this area 2 will result more homogeneous and perhaps 
lower than the limit of 20 mSv/year. However, two options could 
be explored to handle these locally high dose rates. The first one 
is the use of "dose stoppers" such as water tanks or polyethylene 
blocks placed in front of the pinholes outside the beam tubes. Other 
option could be a "dose tube", what is a tube made of a neutron 
reflecting material. Nothing would be inside these tubes, and dose 
rates outside would be attainable. 
Considering the results of the previous design [1,2], together 
with the obtained results, we can conclude that outside the 
Bioshield, workers may stand during the operation of the facility. In 
effect, it was already a free-exclusion area in the previous design, 
and in the current design, there are bigger shields. Furthermore, it is 
seen in Fig. 3 that with the exception of the pinhole projections, the 
area 2 is close to the limit. Then, 2 m of extra shield, the Bioshield, 
will protect the workers. 
3.2.2. Dose to optics 
The optical systems can be deteriorated in the presence of neu-
tron and gamma irradiation in several ways [16,17]. In the current 
design of HiPER 4a there are two groups of optical elements: the 
"renewable lenses" and the "Final Optics Assembly". The main 
threat for the renewable lenses is the short-term survivability. They 
are placed at 8 m from the center of the reaction chamber, and 
there is no shield between them and the particles and radiation 
resulting from the fusion explosions. Ions and X-rays will quickly 
melt and deteriorate the lenses. Some systems and special materi-
als are being explored in the project to improve this situation, but 
nowadays, it is considered that damage in these lenses will be high 
enough to imply frequent renovations. 
However, there is another group, the Final Optics Assembly, 
placed at 19 m from the center of the reaction chamber, which 
is composed by different optical components (mirrors, frequency 
convertors and focusing lenses). This group is very important and 
is protected in this scheme of Target Bay. The first protection, an 
indirect one, is the chamber shield, which reduces the amount of 
neutrons escaping from the chamber. The other two protections 
are direct shields devoted to decrease the damage in this group of 
lenses: (i) the Final Optics Assembly Shield, acting as a contention 
barrier limiting the end of area 1 and the beginning of area 2; and 
(ii) pinhole shield, decreasing the total amount of particles coming 
out through the penetrations in the FOA shield (see Fig. 2). 
The damage generation in the lenses requires a study apart. 
However, we have assessed the average absorbed dose rates in all 
the components of the Final Optics Assembly to evaluate the impact 
of the shields on this group of lenses. In separate contributions, we 
depict inTable 1 the average absorbed dose rate derived exclusively 
from the particles spreading through the pinhole (direct particles) 
and, on the other hand, the averaged absorbed dose rates due to 
the rest of the particles (indirect particles). These contributions 
Table 2 
Averaged absorbed dose rate in FOA for HiPER 4a advanced design with the absence 
of FOA shield and pinhole shield, and contributions. 
Residual dose rate to people between bursts 
—•—chamber —•—area! — 
Neutrons absence 
ofshields 
Gamma absence of 
shields 
Total Ratio 
Gy/year 14.1 37.7 51.8 88547 
are subdivided in neutrons and gammas contributions. To assess 
the impact of the shields in the protection of the FOA, the results 
are compared, in Table 2, with the average absorbed dose rate in 
the absence of FOA and pinhole shields.The first point to note is 
the important reduction of absorbed dose rates in burst operation 
regime in the Final Optics Assembly compared to that in the pre-
vious design [ 1 ]. This is due to the reduction of total neutron yield 
(120,000 MJ/year in the previous irradiation scheme, 5200MJ/year 
in the current one) plus the increment of thickness in the chamber 
shield, FOA shield and pinhole shield.lt is observed that absorbed 
dose rates arise mainly due to the particles coming out through the 
pinhole (99.9% of the total absorbed dose rate). Then, an increase of 
the FOA shield thickness cannot reduce the induced damage in this 
group of lenses. However, the presence of FOA and pinhole shield 
makes a considerable difference with the situation of absence of 
shields. The averaged absorbed dose rates are reduced by almost 
six orders of magnitude. 
3.2. Period between bursts 
Due to the neutron spreading during the explosions of the burst 
regime operation, the materials in the target bay get activated. The 
resulting decay gammas account for the residual dose rates which 
will affect both to workers and FOA. 
There is no maintenance plan and no task definition to be per-
formed in the target bay, thus we do not compute a dose rate map. 
Instead of it, we compute the time evolution of the averaged dose 
rates between bursts (1 week period). We also compute the con-
tributions of the different components to the dose rates (both to 
workers and FOA) and its time evolution. In this way, we offer the 
following information: regarding to workers, the time evolution of 
the ambient dose equivalent averaged in whole areas is presented. 
Together with it, we also present the main contributors to the dose 
rates in that area, and its time evolution. With regards to FOA, we 
present the time evolution of the absorbed dose rates averaged in all 
the components and the time evolution of the main contributions 
to this quantity. 
3.2.1. Dose to workers from decay gammas 
In the period between bursts, certain tasks might be done in 
the target bay. The residual dose rates will impose the necessity of 
remote handling in some areas of the target bay, as manual han-
dling will be possible in some others. We evaluate this situation by 
means of computing the averaged ambient dose equivalents in the 
following areas: inside the reaction chamber, and areas 1, 2. Con-
sidering the study in the previous design, we conclude that area 3 
does not present any trouble related to activation, and no further 
study is made here. 
In Fig. 5, we present the time evolution of the averaged residual 
dose rate from the end of a burst up to the beginning of the next one 
(one week of period between bursts) for the different rooms. As it 
is concerned to workers, we calculated the ambient dose equiva-
lent. It has been found no accumulative effect between bursts. In 
the period of one week, the dominating isotopes to the residual 
dose rate are short-life isotopes. The information that we present, 
is referred to the period after 30 years of irradiation, but we have 
verified that it is the same that after the first burst. 
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Fig. 5. Averaged residual dose rate between bursts to workers inside the chamber, 
in area 1 and area 2. Ambient dose equivalent to workers after the last burst. 
Inside the chamber and in area 1, remote handling is necessary, 
as the limit of 10 |jiSv/h is not fulfilled between bursts. This behavior 
is not altered from the previous design. However, in area 2, manual 
maintenance is possible from the end of the burst. In the previous 
design, it was necessary to spend 36 h of cooling time before the 
limit was reached. Then, there is no motivation for exploring alter-
natives to reduce the residual dose rate in area 2. This change is 
due to the increase of shields and the reduction of total neutron 
yield, as the amount of neutrons reaching this area 2 has decreased 
significantly. 
We go deeper in the analysis of the situations inside the cham-
ber and area 1, as they are the troublesome rooms in the period 
between bursts. Inside the chamber, the contributions to the resid-
ual dose rate are found in Fig. 6. 
From the shutdown to 1 h, the chamber and the rims contribu-
tions increase from a 15% to 95%, decreasing the contribution of 
the chamber shield. This is also their contribution at the time of 
one week, when the next burst starts. The residual dose rates aris-
ing from the chamber and rims at the time of one week are mainly 
due to 106Agm (7.8%), »°Agm (25.7%) and 54Mn (46.2%). The two 
first isotopes derive from the Ag initial concentration in the T91 
steel alloy, being an impurity. The 54Mn derives from the Fe, main 
intended element of the steel alloy. 
In the area 1, the contributions of the different components to 
the residual dose rate are depicted in Fig. 7. 
The pinhole shield and FOA shield dominate (90% of the total 
contribution) from the shutdown to one hour. After one hour, the 
situation is inverted (<30% of the total contribution) in benefit of 
the tubes and rails. At one week, the main contributions are in 
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Fig. 6. Contribution of target bay components to residual dose rates inside the 
chamber. Ambient dose equivalent to workers. 
Table 3 
Main contributing isotopes to residual dose rate in area 1 at one week. 
Component Contribution Main isotopes 
Rims 
Rails 
Pinhole Shield 
Tubes 1 
FOA shield 
4% 
5% 
25% 
27% 
40% 
106Agm (4.9%)F H0Agm (41.g%)F 54M n (32.1%) 
58Co (10.4%), 60Co (29.7%), 59Fe (26.8%), 54Mn (26.5%) 
46Sc (94.6%), 24Na (5.0%) 
106Agm (9.4%)F H0Agm (18,6%), 54M n (49,9%) 
46Sc (83.3%), 24Na (9.1%) 
Table 3.Given the specific contribution of the components, the most 
important isotopes at that time in the area 1 are 46Sc and 54Mn. 
46Sc derives from Sc in the concrete; 54Mn is produced in the Fe 
of the T91 steels alloy of the tubes. Replacing the materials for the 
tubes or exploring the viability of zero presence of Scandium in 
the concrete could result in the reduction of the dose rates. These 
changes represent a factor 9 of reduction of the dose rates, they 
would be enough, as a reduction factor 24 is necessary to allow 
manual handling in area 1 before 1 week.If manual maintenance is 
mandatory in this area 1, further strategies will be necessary. We 
would suggest, timetable planning for exposures, different shield-
ing configurations and alternative materials for FOA and pinhole 
shielding. 
3.2.2. Dose to optics from decay gammas 
The FOA is a very important group of optical elements. This 
group focuses the laser beam, it converts its frequency, and extracts 
a part of it to do diagnostics. It is then important that the damage 
due to the irradiation does not alter its optical properties. 
During the burst operation, a combined irradiation of neutrons 
and gammas reaches this group of lenses during very short peri-
ods of time. In the period between bursts, this group is exposed 
to continuous gamma irradiation, much lower in intensity, but for 
significantly longer times of exposures. The integrated deposited 
energy over a year could give rise to a source of damage similar to 
that of burst operation. Thus, we compute the absorbed dose rate 
during the period between bursts. 
In Fig. 8, we show the time evolution of the residual dose rate 
in the FOA. It is seen that integrating the dose rates over the whole 
year, this term of dose is in the order of magnitude of 10~3 Gy/year, 
what is higher than the integrated dose rate deposited in a year 
due to burst operation. Thus, if the absorbed dose rates during the 
burst operation (neutron and gammas, Table 1) were considered 
to be troublesome, the integrated residual dose rate (only gamma) 
also has to be taken into account as a source of damage, as they are 
similar in magnitude. 
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3.3. End of life 
The estimated lifetime for the facility HiPER 4a is 30 years. The 
waste management of the facility after the irradiation is manda-
tory from the design phase, to minimize the volume, and plan the 
decommissioning. We focus on strategies that avoid the burial or 
long-term storage. Thus, we explore the two following strategies: 
clearance and recycling. We also compute, as a guide the WDR 
index, to know if the waste could be allocated in a shallow-land 
burial, as last alternative if clearance and recycling were not pos-
sible. The quantities are evaluated for activated materials after 30 
years of irradiation. 
To perform the evaluation of clearance, we follow the clear-
ance index. If this CI index is below the unit, the clearance of this 
material is possible. This option is the preferred solution, as the 
components would undergo declassification as radioactive mate-
rial. However this strategy is very demanding and it is not always 
possible. Regarding to recycling, we consider the procedures given 
in [14]. If the material to be recycled is steel, it is necessary to reach 
a specific activity below 1000 Bq/cm3; this permits to process the 
steel alloy in foundries. If it is not steel, the only restriction for 
recycling has to do with the decay heat. Below 2000W/m3 [14], 
active cooling is no longer necessary, and recycling is possible. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of the contact dose rate (CDR) indi-
cates whether the material may be manually handled or if remote 
handling is necessary for the manipulation. 
In Table 4 we present the evaluation of the different indexes for 
all the components of the target bay. The appearing order in the 
table is done by materials: steels, concretes and silica. The steel 
selection for the reaction chamber is deeply studied in [2]. 
In general, the components made of steel do not easily fulfill 
clearance limits (with the exception tubes in area 2), and they 
require less than 30 years to be recycled in foundries and less than 
20 years to allow manual handling. The components made of con-
crete can undergo clearance with few years of cooling time (with 
the exception of the chamber shield, which requires 70 years). They 
can be recycled from the shutdown, given their low residual heat, 
and require some months to allow the manual handling. The opti-
cal components, which will not be probably exposed to radiation 
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Fig. 7. Contribution of target bay components to residual dose rates in area 1. Ambi-
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Table 4 
Waste management assessment summary for the target bay components. 
Contr ibut ions to residual dose in area 1 
Component 
Chamber 
Rims 
Tubesl 
Tubes2 
Rails 
Chamber shield 
Pinhole shield 
FOA shield 
Bio shield 
Renewable lenses 
FOA 
Clearance 
No 
No 
45 years 
Always 
30 years 
70 years 
5 years 
3 years 
Always 
3 days 
Always 
Recycling 
26 years 
20 years 
15 years 
Always 
5 months 
Always 
Always 
Always 
Always 
Always 
Always 
Manual handling 
20 years 
15 years 
5 years 
0.5 h 
2 weeks 
3 months 
1 month 
6 months 
Always 
2h 
0.5 h 
the 30 years of lifetime of the facility, can undergo clearance and be 
recycled manually from almost the shutdown.We have also evalu-
ated the WDRfor Shallow-land burial (SLB) as Class C wastes [15]. 
It is not necessary because the components can be managed with 
no radiological waste disposal (clearance and recycling), but we 
estimated important to offer this information for comparing with 
DEMO reactors, were SLB is an important alternative. We found that 
the WDR is orders of magnitude below the limit for SLB thus the 
whole target bay could be allocated in a shallow-land burial if nec-
essary .There is however another issue in connection with the WMA, 
related to the residual dose rate emitted by all the components. It 
is critical to decide if remote operation is necessary to extract the 
components from the target bay. Certain tasks of pre-processing 
for the waste management (cutting, packing, cleaning...) might be 
done in situ. We have then computed in Fig. 9, the time evolution 
of the residual dose rate inside the reaction chamber and in area 1 
from 1 week to 100 years, together with the time evolution of the 
contributions of the components. 
It is necessary to spend 3 years to allow the entrance in the 
area 1, and 7 years to allow the entrance inside the chamber. After 
this time, and fulfilling the restrictions imposed by the CDR of the 
components inside the rooms (Table 4), manual manipulation is 
allowed. This option is an advantage because it avoids the neces-
sity of certain equipment to prepare the waste management of the 
components. 
The contributions of the different components to the residual 
dose rates inside the chamber are the same from 1 week to 7 years 
(see Fig. 6). Inside the chamber the responsible components for the 
dose rates are the chamber itself and the rims. 
In the area 1, the time evolution of the contributions from 1 
week to 4 years is shown in Fig. 10. 
It is seen that from 6 months to 4 years, the tubes are the main 
responsible for the residual dose rate in area 1. Around 4 years, the 
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Fig. 9. Averaged residual dose rate after the final shutdown inside the chamber and 
in area f. Ambient dose equivalent to workers. 
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Fig. 10. Contribution of target bay components to the residual dose rate after the 
final shutdown in area 1. 
main isotopes contributing to it are 60Co and 54Mn. The first one 
derives from both the Ni and Co impurities in T91, and the second 
one derives from the Iron. Impurities control could improve the 
situation reducing the dose rate at that time. Other strategy would 
be replacing the tubes and rails material; the cooling time to allow 
the entrance in area 1 could be shorter by means of lower activation 
materials for tubes 1 and rails as they account for the 55% of the 
contribution to the dose rates around 4 years of cooling time. 
4. Conclusions 
We have performed an overview of the radiological response of 
the facility divided in three stages: burst operation, period between 
bursts and decommissioning. The HiPER 4a model is divided in 
rooms occupying the space between shields: between the cham-
ber shield and the FOA shield we find the area 1. Outside the FOA 
shield and inside the Bioshield the area 2 is found. The space outside 
the Bioshield is the area 3. 
In the burst operation, the entrance in area 1 is forbidden. In 
area 2 there are some places where workers could stand, but it is 
recommended a deeper analysis, taking into account future details 
definitions in the design such as roofs, floors, doors, equipment pen-
etrations, etc. In area 3 the entrance is allowed with no exception. 
Regarding to the computation of ambient dose equivalent, it has 
been found that more than 99.99% of the doses to workers in any 
location of area 2 are due to particles coming through the pinholes. 
It is has been found unacceptable the simplification in the modeling 
of a no-pinhole FOA shield. With regards to the final optics assem-
bly, in this new design, it has been found that the absorbed dose 
rates have significantly decreased compared to the early design, 
given the increase in the chamber shield, FOA shield, and pinhole 
shield thickness. The 99.9% of the dose rates in FOA are due to par-
ticles coming through the pinhole. It has also been assessed the 
impact of the presence of the FOA shield and pinhole shield in the 
FOA absorbed dose rate. It has been estimated that the presence 
of these shields reduces into almost six orders of magnitude the 
absorbed dose rate in FOA. 
The calculation of ambient dose equivalent in the period 
between bursts indicates that the entrance is forbidden inside the 
chamber and in the area 1. The main responsible components of 
the target bay for the residual dose rates inside the chamber and 
area 1 have been identified together with the most contributing iso-
topes. Inside the chamber at one-week, the chamber and rims are 
the responsible components for the dose rates, and 106Agm, 110Agm 
and 54Mn the responsible isotopes. The two first derive from the 
Ag in the T91, an impurity. The last one derives from the Fe, main 
intended element is the steel alloy. In the area two, the responsible 
components for the dose rates ate one week are the tubes 1, the 
pinhole shield and the FOA shield. The main responsible isotopes 
are 54Mn and 46Sc. The first one derives from the Fe of the tubes 
steel T91, and the second one is created from the Sc present in the 
concrete of the shields. The area 2 and the area 3 are free of restric-
tions from the end of the burst. In the previous design, the area 
2 needed 36 h to allow the entrance, but the increment of shields 
thicknesses changed this situation. With regards to absorbed dose 
rates in FOA in the period between bursts, it is found that the year-
integrated residual dose rate and the year-integrated prompt dose 
rate in the FOA are of the same order of magnitude. 
The waste management evaluation shows attractive alterna-
tives in the short and mid-term. All the components, with the 
exception of the chamber, the rims, the chamber shield and the 
tubes of area 1, fulfill the clearance limits before 30 years. Those 
components which cannot undergo a clearance in 30 years may be 
manually recycled before 30 years. Thus, we conclude that in 30 
years, the whole target bay may be managed as a waste with no 
burial needs. We have also evaluated the residual dose rate inside 
the chamber and in area 1. This information is important to make 
decisions on the kind (remote or manual) of in situ pre-processing 
(cutting, packing, cleaning...) for the waste management of the 
components. It has been found that after 3 years, the entrance 
is allowed in area 1, while 7 years are necessary to access the 
interior of the reaction chamber. The results have been obtained 
considering impurities in commercial materials. This means that 
the impurities effect is not very relevant, since its presence does not 
imply advanced control to allow a reasonable waste management. 
5. Future work 
In future work, it is necessary to study in detail the response 
of the FOA, element by element. The impact of the dose coming 
through the pinhole might be critical in the facing mirror. Fur-
thermore, if the ions and X-rays impact on the renewable lenses is 
avoided, and it is assumed a long-term survivability for these com-
ponents, it will be necessary to evaluate the absorbed dose induced 
by neutrons and gammas in this group of lenses. 
When a plan of maintenance is defined, it will be interesting 
to compute a residual dose rate map. Together with the time-table 
information, it can be calculated the collective dose to workers, and 
support the decision making on maintenance plan. 
Further details definitions in the design will alter the obtained 
results.The presence of floors and roofs, doors, and new equipment 
penetrations will modify the prompt and the residual dose rates and 
the WMA. The presence of machinery, properly shielded against 
radiation, will also alter the residual dose rates. In this HiPER 4a 
design, no component with structural function has been defined. 
When the brackets, supports and concrete structure will be defined, 
some additional amount of steel will be probably introduced in the 
target bay, and another radiological characterization will have to 
be accomplished. 
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